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THE HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION REVISITED WITH
A NEW TEST UNDER BODZIN V. COMMISSIONER
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides for
the deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
.
. "I Until the recent Fourth Circuit decision in Bodzin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,2 the controversy over an employee's
right to a deduction for using a portion of his residence as an office
appeared settled. When an employee3 attempted to deduct his home
office expenses, the courts assumed with little or no discussion that
the taxpayer was "carrying on" a business, and the only issues to be
decided were whether the expenses were "ordinary" and "necessary."' After years of conflicting decisions, the elements constituting
"ordinary" and "necessary" expenses seemed solidified:5 any noncapital expenditure was "ordinary," ' and a showing that the home
office was "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business satisfied the "necessary" requirement.7 Since expenses incurred in the
maintenance of a home office, such as heat and electricity, are not
capital expenditures, the employee was allowed the § 162 deduction
if he could establish that the maintenance of the home office was
appropriate and helpful.
The Fourth Circuit in Bodzin radically departed from this traditional analysis. The court did not question the established standards
of "ordinary" and "necessary," ' but focused on the assumption, gen-

I INT. REV.

CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975), reversing, 60 T.C. 820 (1973). Subsequent to the
preparation of this article, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bodzin. 44 U.S.L.W.
3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
3 An "employee" is to be distinguished from a "professional" or a "selfemployee." In this Comment, the later two terms are used synonymously with respect
to § 162. See Staller, The Second Office at Home, 58 A.B.A.J. 526, 527 (1972).
1 See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9188, at 86,284 (D.N.H.
1975); Christopher A. Rafferty, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem 848 (1971); Marvin L. Dietrich,
30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9754, at
85,482 (8th Cir. 1974).
5 Note, Newi v. Commissioner:Home Office Deductions and Equal Treatmentfor
Employees, 47 IND. L.J. 546, 547-48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Equal Treatment].
I Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1970); LeRoy W. Gillis, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 429 (1973); Herman E.
Bischoff, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966).
A capital expenditure is one that secures to the taxpayer an advantage which has
a life of more than one year. United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744-(10th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958).
7 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933), and cases cited note 4 supra.
8 For a discussion of the historical development of the "ordinary and necessary"
2
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erally unquestioned by the judiciary, that the home office expense
was a business one in the first instance. A finding that the maintenance of a home office was not a business expense within the meaning
of § 162(a) would preclude any examination of the qualifying factors
of "ordinary" and "necessary." If non-business, the expense must
be personal and thus non-deductible under § 262.1 Although few
decisions dealing with the home office deduction prior to Bodzin
discussed the interplay between § 162 and § 262,10 the'Fourth Circuit found the relationship crucial.
The petitioner was employed as an attorney-advisor with the Internal Revenue Service. His duties primarily involved researching
and rendering opinions on particular tax law problems. On each problem he would analyze the facts and issues, research the topic extensively, confer with others, and finally prepare a memorandum which
would be submitted to his superiors for review. Bodzin usually
worked independently, without day-to-day supervision. He was permitted to set his own deadlines, but was expected to adhere to the
Service's policy of reasonable promptness in the completion of cases.
The quality of his work, however, was of primary importance, so that
he could and often did extend his target dates. Bodzin's employer did
not require, request, expect, or encourage the petitioner to work overtime, yet the petitioner often did so in order to meet deadlines, selfimposed or otherwise, and to insure the quality of his work."
The IRS offices were located in Washington, D.C., ten miles from
petitioner's Alexandria, Virginia, apartment. 2 Bodzin was furnished
an office in the building, which was air-conditioned or heated 24hours a day, seven days per week. The building was always open to
those with proper identification, which the petitioner possessed.
requirement, see Equal Treatment, supra note 5; Comment, Stephen A. Bodzin and
George W. Gino: Liberalizationof the Employee's Home Office Deduction, 59 IOWA L.
REV. 1324 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Liberalization].
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
,0 The Commissioner has rarely used § 262 itself as a vehicle to deny a home office
deduction. Rather, he has relied on Revenue Ruling No. 180 (see notes 32-33 and
accompanying text infra) in attempting to deny the deduction on the grounds that the
home office was not required by the employer as a condition of employment. See e.g.,
James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971); Christopher A. Rafferty, 30
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1971); Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1971),
aff'd per curiam, 74-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. T 9754, at 85,482 (8th Cir. 1974); cf. Newi v.
Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
11509 F.2d at 680.
12 Brief for Appellees at 13-14, Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.
1975).
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Thus, had he chosen to do so, Bodzin could have worked comfortably
in his IRS office at any time he desired.1 3 However, because of the
inconvenience of staying after normal working hours or, alternatively,
of returning to his Washington office after eating dinner at home, the
petitioner almost always chose to take his work home with him.' 4 He
considered this to be the most convenient and efficient method of
carrying out his duties.' 5
Bodzin's Alexandria apartment contained a separate study, in
which the petitioner housed various tax treatises and lawbooks, along
with some personal books. The study was not used to entertain visitors and was used almost exclusively by Bodzin, although occasionally for non-business purposes.' The petitioner generally worked in
his home office two or three evenings a week and for three to five
hours on weekends. The work consisted of reviewing recent tax developments, researching the cases assigned him, preparing the first
drafts of his memoranda, and preparing for future conferences.' 7 During 1967, the Bodzins paid $2,100 rent. They allocated $100 of this
amount to the use of the study as a home office and deducted it as a
§ 162 business expense. The Commissioner denied the deduction,' 8
but was overruled by the Tax Court.
In reversing the Tax Court's allowance of the deduction,' the
Fourth Circuit relied heavily on a statement made by the United
States Supreme Court in a recent tax case."° The Supreme Court held
that § 161 requires that the deductions allowed by Part VI of the Code
be "'subject to the exceptions provided in Part IX.' "I' The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that since Part VI includes § 162 and Part IX includes § 262, the § 161 "priority-ordering directive" demanded that
the disallowance of personal, living, and family expenses of § 262 take
precedence over the business expense deductions permitted by §
162(a).1 In other words, Bodzin's home office expense was personal,
and hence non-deductible.
In further support of its determination that Bodzin's home-office
expense was non-deductible, the Fourth Circuit applied the guide' Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 824 (1973) (four judges dissenting).
" Id. at 823. See note 55 infra.
1I Id.

509 F.2d at 680.
Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 823 (1973).
" Id. at 824.
" Id.
17

1 Commissioner v.

Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
at 17, citing INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 161.
509 F.2d at 681.

22 Id.

2
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lines set forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.262-1(b)(3),2 which disallows business deductions for the cost of maintaining a house in which
the taxpayer only incidentally conducts his business.u However, a
deduction is allowed for those expenses attributable to the part of
the house used as the taxpayer's place of business.2 The court of
appeals found that "Bodzin did not use any part of his apartment as
his place of business, ' 2 but merely chose to do some of his reading
and writing at home. Hence, the claimed expense was personal and
non-deductible. Having concluded that the expense was personal,
the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the home office
was appropriate and helpful-i. e., "necessary"-in the carrying on of
27
Bodzin's business.
The Fourth Circuit's holding .in Bodzin directly conflicts with the
modern judicial trend of allowing the home office deduction to employees. The trend was initiated to remedy the inequality that previously existed between self-employed persons, who were allowed
home office deductions, and employees, who were generally denied
them.2 8 This former difference in treatment was not dictated by the
Internal Revenue Code, but rather by judicial construction of § 162.21
Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (1960), as amended, T.D. 7207, 37 F.R. 20795 (Oct.
4, 1972), provides:
Expenses of maintaining a household, including amounts paid for
rent, water, utilities, domestic service, and the like, are not deductible. A taxpayer who rents a property for residential purposes, but
incidentally conducts business there (his place of business being elsewhere) shall not deduct any part of the rent. If, however, he uses part
of the house as his place of business, such portion of the rent and other
similar expenses as is properly attributable to such place of business
is deductible as a business expense.
24 Id.
'Id.

26 509 F.2d at 681.

SId.
Traditionally, an employee was required to show that his home office was a
necessary condition of his employment. See, e.g., Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962),
vacated, No. 18188 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1964); Valentine J. Anzalone, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 497 (1964). A self-employed taxpayer, however, was not required to meet the
condition of employment test. He would only have to show that the expense was
"necessary." See Liberalization,supra note 8, at 1325.
2 Why courts have distinguished between employees and non-employees is unclear. Perhaps the reason lies in the distinction found in § 62 of the Code, which defines
adjusted gross income. Whereas non-employee taxpayers are permitted to deduct all
business expenses in arriving at adjusted gross income, .employees, other than outside
salesmen, are limited to reimbursed expenses, expenses for travel away from home, and
transportation expenses. Hence, an employee's expenses for the maintenance of a home
office are only deductible from adjusted gross income. This difference in treatment
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The courts regularly allowed office-in-home deductions to selfemployed persons because their expenses were always deemed to be
incurred as a result of their business activities, and because they
could easily prove that the expenses were ordinary and necessary in
carrying on their businesses." The employee, on the other hand, was
forced to show that his home office was required by his employer as
a condition of employment.3 ' Without such a showing the employee's
deduction was disallowed. The Internal Revenue Service attempted
to solidify the judicially created "condition of employment" standard
in Revenue Ruling No. 180,32 which stated:
An employee who, as a condition of his employment, is
required to provide his own space and facilities for performance of his duties and regularly uses a portion of his personal
residence for that purpose may deduct a pro rata portion of the
expenses of maintenance and depreciation on his residence.
However, the voluntary, occasional, or incidental use by an
employee of a part of his residence in connection with his employment does not entitle him to a business expense deduction
for any portion of the depreciation and expenses of maintaining his residence. . ..
Because of the obvious inequality between professionals and employees resulting from the judicial interpretation of the IRC and the above
Revenue Ruling, many courts refused to follow the "condition of employment" test." Courts and commentators generally believed that
between non-employees and employees found in the Code itself might have led courts
to impose a stricter test of deductibility on the later. For other suggestions, see
Liberalization, supra note 8, at 1326 & n.25; Equal Treatment, supra note 5,at 548.
See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
' See cases cited note 28 supra.
3 Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 52.
33 Id.
at 52-53. The Regulation further provides:
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish (1) that,
as a condition of his employment, he is required to provide his own
space and facilities for performance of some of his duties, (2) that he
regularly uses a part of his personal residence for that purpose, (3) the
portion of his personal residence which is so used, (4) the extent of
such use, and (5) the pro rata portion of the depreciation and expenses
for maintaining his residence which is properly attributable to such
use.
Id. at 53.
3 The Tax Court in Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1971), stated:
Respondent argues that an employee may not deduct the expense
of an office in his home unless he is required to maintain one as a
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the Second Circuit's decision in Newi v. Commissioner3 5 finally
placed the employee on a par with the professional, at least as far as
the home office deduction was concerned, by decisively rejecting the
"condition of employment" standard. 6
In Newi, the petitioner was an outside salesman37 of television
time for the American Broadcasting Company. He used a study in his
apartment as an office in which to review his notes on the day's
selling activities, study research materials and ratings, plan his next
day's work, and view the television advertisements of his employer
and its competitors. The office was not used for entertaining or personal television viewing. Newi's employer did not require or request
that the petitioner maintain a home office, and the office provided
by the employer was open in the evenings and was furnished with the
equipment that Newi needed.
In affirming the Tax Court's holding 8 that the expenses attributable to the maintenance of the home office were deductible, the Second Circuit found that Newi "would have missed many of the programs which would have been of importance to him" if he had returned to his office in the evening. 9 This determination involved the
issue of whether the expenses were ordinary and necessary, and since
condition of his employment. He cites Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B.
52. We reject this position. [Citations omitted].
• . . To meet the ordinary and necessary requirements of the
statute, it is sufficient that the expense be "appropriate and helpful"
to the taxpayer's business. [Citations omitted]. We can see no reason
for imposing a stricter standard upon taxpayers whose trade or business is that of an employee.
Id. at 686. In a more recent case, the Tax Court stated: "Any ruling that even tends
to make the Internal Revenue Code more equitable should be welcomed." Hall v.
United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9188, at 86,284, 86,286 (D.N.H. 1975).
- 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686 (1969).
"' As stated by the Tax Court: "[W]e are unaware of any legal requirement that
the expenditure must be 'required' before it qualifies as an allowable business expense." George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 686, 691 (1969). See Equal Treatment, supra note 5; 74 W. VA. L. REv. 423 (1972); Karachale, Deduction for Office-atHome Expenses by Employees, 50 TAxEs 343 (1972).
The rejection of the condition of employment standard left employees with the sole
burden of showing that their expenses were ordinary and necessary. After Newi, then,
employees and non-employees were placed on an equal footing.
11A taxpayer is an outside salesman "if [his] trade or business consists of the
performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee and if such trade or business
is to solicit, away from the employer's place of business, business for the employer."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2)(D).
George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686 (1969).
3' 432 F.2d at 1000.
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the use of the home office to view the television was appropriate and
helpful to Newi's business, it met the "necessary" requirement." Although the Second Circuit did not expressly define the maintenance
of Newi's home office as a business expense," implicit in the court's
affirmance of the Tax Court was acceptance of the latter's finding
that the home office was not a § 262 personal expense. Noting that
Newi used his home office approximately three hours each night to
perform his various activities, the Tax Court stated: "We therefore
conclude that the study was used regularly and extensively by petitioner for business purposes that were proximately related to his business of being an outside salesman of television time."42 The definition
of the elements of a "business expense"-regular and extensive use
of the home office for business purposes-which the Tax Court provided and the Second Circuit affirmed in Newi is of great significance
both in the area of office-in-home deductions generally and with respect to Bodzin particularly.
Prior to Newi, the issue of what constituted a business expense
was never squarely addressed by the courts. Language can be found
in several decisions to the effect that the home office expenses were
"proximately related"43 or "directly related"44 to the taxpayer's business, but the courts did not find it necessary to explain these terms.
In most cases there were only vague references to the character of the
expense, 5 and in some cases no reference was made at all.4" Most
40Id.
" Although the Second Circuit did reject the Commissioner's contention that the
expense was a § 262 personal expense, it did not explain why it was a business expense
other than to quote the last sentence of Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3), cited note 23 supra.
The gravamen of the opinion discussed the construction of "ordinary and necessary"
as "appropriate and helpful." 432 F.2d at 1000.
11George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686, 691 (1969).
13 See, e.g., Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685, 687 (1971) ("We think
petitioners' expenses were 'ordinary and necessary' and proximately related to their
work."); Herman E. Bischoff, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538, 539 (1966) ("[E]ach of the
component items in dispute represents expenditures which in our judgment are proximately related to petitioner's trade or business.").
1,See, e.g., James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074, 1078 (1971)
("[Pletitioners' use of the room in this case is ordinary and necessary in relation to
their duties as teachers, and the use is reasonable and directly related to the business
of teaching.").
11See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9188, at 86,284, 86,285
(D.N.H. 1975) ("As an employee, plaintiff is 'carrying on [a] trade or business' within
the meaning of [26 U.S.C. § 162]."); Christopher A. Rafferty, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
848, 850 (1971) ("[W]e are persuaded that he did use [his apartment] to some extent
in carrying on his business as a development engineer. .. ").
,1See, e.g., Jay R. Gill, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 10 (1975); LeRoy W. Gillis, 32 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 429 (1973).
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courts, then, found the problem of characterizing the expense less
important than the issue of whether the expense was ordinary and
necessary. Thus, the primary significance of Newi lay in the Tax
Court's original discussion of what constituted a business expense.
The Fourth Circuit in Bodzin refused to follow Newi and attempted to distinguish it on the basis that the Second Circuit had
expressly confined its decision to the facts there presentedY Yet the
facts of the two cases, at least with respect to the characterization of
the home office expense, are strikingly similar. Both taxpayers utilized their offices for approximately equal amounts of time,48 both
studied research materials,49 and both planned future activities."
Neither taxpayer was required or requested to maintain a home office
and both were provided by their employers with adequately furnished
and comfortable offices. The only distinction appears to be that, in
his home office, Newi viewed certain television advertisements which
he would have missed if he~had returned to his ABC office. This final
element, however, did not enter into the Tax Court's decision that the
home office expense was a business one; it was merely one of the
elements that was determinative of the fact that the expense was
appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business. The criteria used
to determine that the expense was a business one were the regular
and extensive use of the home office for purposes proximately related
to Newi's business. If this standard were applied to Bodzin, Bodzin's
regular and extensive use of his home office for the purposes of researching and writing memoranda would seem sufficiently related to
his business as an attorney for the Internal Revenue Service to qualify
the use of his home office as a business use. In fact, the Tax Court
found as an ultimate fact "that the expenses at issue were directly
related1 . . . to [Bodzin's] business-that of a Government attor5
ney."

509 F.2d at 681, citing 432 F.2d at 1000.
Bodzin used his office two or three evenings per week and three to five hours
on weekends. 509 F.2d at 680. Newi used his office an average of three hours a night.
George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686, 688 (1969).
11Bodzin's office contained a looseleaf tax service, a set of Seidman's Legislative
History of the Income Tax Laws, and tax treatises and lawbooks. Stephen A. Bodzin,
60 T.C. 820, 823 (1973). Newi studied various research materials and ratings in his
office. George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686, 688 (1969).
Bodzin prepared for upcoming conferences in his office. Stephen A. Bodzin, 60
T.C. 820, 823 (1973). Newi made plans for the next day's work. George H. Newi, 28
CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 686, 688 (1969).
51Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 826 (1973) (emphasis added).
Even the Commissioner agreed with the Tax Court's characterization of a business
expense. As stated in his brief on appeal to the Fourth Circuit:
'7
"
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Since the Tax Court found that Bodzin's home office expenses
were business in nature, the Fourth Circuit was not at liberty to
disturb such a finding unless the lower court's determination was.
clearly erroneous. 52 A finding of "clearly erroneous" would appear
wholly unwarranted since both the Tax Court and the Commissioner
agreed on the proper standard for characterizing a business expense,53
and the Tax Court found that the petitioner's expenses met the qualifications for deductibility. The court of appeals, however, did not
explicitly reject the findings of the lower court. After making reference to § 1.262-1(b)(3) of the Treasury Regulations, the Fourth Circuit summarily stated that no part of the taxpayer's apartment was
used as his place of business."
In light of the Fourth Circuit's denial of the deduction, the following statement in Bodzin seems highly enigmatic:
Many Tax Court cases have been cited by taxpayers and
the Commissioner. In those in which deduction was allowed
Personal expenses are those which lack the necessary direct
relation to the prosecution of the business of the taxpayer or his em-,
ployer. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470-474 (1946):
Thus, the showing of such proximate relationshipis required in order
to qualify the expense as a "business" expense within the meaning of
Section 162(a). . . . Cf. InternationalTrading Co. v. Commissioner,
275 F.2d 578 (C.A. 7, 1960).
Brief for Appellant at 9, Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). The Commissioner has additionally stated: "The performance of services
as an employee constitutes the carrying on of a trade or- business. Therefore, the
ordinary and necessary business expenses of an employee in connection with his
employment are deductible." Rev. Rule. 180, 1962-2 CUM. BuLL. 52 (emphasis added).
Although the Commissioner agreed with the Tax Court's delineation of a business
expense, he stated that the lower court "glossed over the fundamental distinction
between the essentially personal (and, hence, nondeductible) nature of the expense
here involved, and those expenses which are 'incurred. . . in carrying on any trade or
business.'" Brief for Appellant at 9, Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.
1975). However, this appears erroneous. The Tax Court found as an ultimate fact that
Bodzin's expenses were directly related to his job as a Government attorney. Stephen
A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 826 (1973).
52 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Timanus v. Commissioner,
278 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1960).
0 See note 51 supra.
- 509 F.2d at 681. Yet, the determination under the Regulation of whether the
taxpayer only "incidentally conducts business" in his home office (in which case no
deduction would be allowed), or "uses part of the house as his place of business" (in
which case the home office deduction would be allowed), see note 23 supra, was an
issue of fact to be decided by the Tax Court. That court implicitly, if not explicitly,
found that Bodzin used his home office as his place of business, at least to the extent
of $100 per year.
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the office provided by the employer was either not availablein
the evening and on weekends or was not suitable for the purposes for which the taxpayer involved was using a room in his
home. That is not true in the instant case.5
Since the Fourth Circuit concluded that Bodzin's home office expense was a personal one in the first instance, the court found no need
55509 F.2d at 681 (emphasis added). It is arguable that, although the Washington
office was available at nights and on weekends, it was not suitable for the purposes
for which Bodzin was using his home office. The Tax Court found the following facts:
[Pletitioner customarily traveled the 10 miles to and from work in a
carpool that left the Federal Triangle area of downtown Washington,
D.C., shortly after 5:30 p.m. Therefore, whenever petitioner found it
desirable to work past the normal working hours he was faced with the
following three choices: (1) Go home with the carpool and return to
the Internal Revenue Service offices after dinner; (2) use public transportation or call home for a ride after working late at the Internal
Revenue Service offices and eating dinner downtown, eating no dinner, or postponing dinner until arriving at home; (3) bring work home
to his home office. In such situations petitioner almost invariably
chose to bring the work home because it was more convenient to do
so and because he thought it was more efficient.
Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 823 (1973). In LeRoy W. Gillis, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
429 (1973), the fact that the taxpayer's regular office was 12 miles and 15 minutes from
his home was one of four elements considered by the Tax Court in allowing a home
office deduction. The other three elements were the hazards of working alone at night,
the nature of the work performed at home, and the fact that the home office was a
separate room for business use. Id. at 432. Bodzin's regular office was 10 miles and 2030 minutes from his home. Brief for Appellees at 13-14, Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509
F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975). The nature of the work performed in Bodzin's home office
was, according to the Tax Court, directly related to his business. See note 51 and
accompanying text supra. Furthermore, his office was used primarily for business
purposes. Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820, 823 (1973). The only element delineated by the Gillis court lacking in Bodzin was the hazard of working alone at night.
However, since three of the unsuitable elements found in Gillis were also found in
Bodzin, Bodzin's regular office was arguably unsuitable for his purposes.
Moreover, a finding that the use of the home office is convenient fails to render
the expense of maintaining that office a non-deductible, personal one. In Bischoff v.
Commissioner, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966), the petitioner's regular office had
heating and air conditioning problems that made it undesirable to work in after normal
hours. The Tax Court stated, however, that the taxpayer "also found it more efficient
to work at his own studio at home." Id. at 539. Thus, efficiency is an important factor
in determining the deductibility of a home office expense. As long as the expense is
not simply for the taxpayer's convenience, the deduction is appropriate. Stephen A.
Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 826 (1973).
Thus, Bodzin'a regular office was arguably unsuitable not only because of logistical problems, but also because of the ineffeciency of returning to, or staying at, his
Washington office.
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to determine whether the expense was "necessary"-i.e., appropriate
and helpful." However, the elements of non-availability and unsuitability found in the cases cited by the parties,97 and implicitly approved by the Fourth Circuit, have normally been used solely to
determine whether expenses were appropriate and helpful, and therefore "necessary.""5 The majority of cases prior to Newi, including all
those cited in Bodzin, merely assumed that the expense was business
in nature; hence, the only issue was whether it was ordinary (noncapital) and necessary (appropriate and helpful)., 9 But since the
Bodzin court decided only that Bodzin's was not a business expense,
and never reached the question whether the expense was necessary,
it must be inferred that the court was using the availability and
suitability criteria to determine whether the expense was a business
one, and not, as had been prior judicial practice, to test whether the
"business expense" was "necessary." Therefore, it appears that the
509 F.2d at 681.
17Brief for Appellant at 17-18, Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.
1975), citing LeRoy W. Gillis, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 429 (1973); Richard K. Johnson,
31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.941 (1972); James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074
(1971); Chistopher A. Rafferty, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1971); George H. Newi,
28 CCH Tax Ct. Men. 686 (1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Herman E.
Bischoff, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966); Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963). Brief
for Appellees at 9-14, Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975), citing
Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973); Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d
307 (2d Cir. 1953); Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950); LeRoy W. Gillis,
32 CCH Tax Ct. Meri. 429 (1973); Thomas J. Green, 59 T.C. 456 (1972); James L.
Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971); George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
686 (1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
It is important to note that in at least one case cited by both parties, James L.
Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971), the home office deduction was permitted
even though the taxpayer's regular office was both available and suitable. Hence,
although unavailability and unsuitability are sufficient to show that the expense was
"necessary," they are not the only criteria, and availability and suitability would not
preclude a finding of "necessary." See note. 70 and accompanying text infra.
5'The "old" test for the home office deduction can be diagrammed as follows:
Deduction = expense

business
ordinary

I assumed
Inon-capital

&
necessary

appropriate
&
helpful

including,
J factors
but not limited to,
unavailable or
unsuitable

o The Bodzin test for the home office deduction can be diagrammed as follows:
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Fourth Circuit has proposed a new test for the home office deduction.0
Both the drastic departure from well established precedent and
the inconsistencies within the opinion itself suggest that the Fourth
Circuit may simply have been confused by the complexities of the
Tax Code. To illustrate, under the court's test the characterization
of an expense as a business expense will depend upon the necessities
dictated by the circumstances of the taxpayer's employment. If the
employer-provided office is unavailable or unsuitable, the employee's
office will be deductible as a business expense under the Fourth Circuit's definition. If this test is met, then a fortiori the expense is also
appropriate and helpful to the carrying on of the taxpayer's business.
Any inquiry beyond the question whether the expense is business or
personal would be redundant. Nevertheless, the court stated that it
was not necessary to decide the issue whether the expenses were
appropriate and helpful since it had determined that they were personal in the first instance,' thereby indicating that even if the court
had found the office to be unavailable or unsuitable, an additional
determination of appropriate and helpful would have been required.
But since the court found that Bodzin's Washington office was both
available and suitable for his purposes, it effectively found that the
expenses were not appropriate and helpful. Thus, the Fourth Circuit
appears to have decided the very question that it considered unnecessary to determine. 2
The perplexing question that remains is why the Fourth Circuit
felt it necessary to advance a new test of deductibility for home office
expenses. Perhaps the answer lies in the court's desire to follow the
"priority-ordering directive" required by § 1613 and discussed by the

Deduction = expense

business

Imust be unavailable or unsuitable

ordinary

J??

necessary f ??
509 F.2d at 681.
as pointed out earlier, it was not the Fourth Circuit's function to
redetermine the Tax Court's findings of fact on the issue of appropriate and helpful
unless it was willing to conclude that those findings were clearly erroneous. The court
of appeals was not so willing. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 161 provides:
In computing taxable income under section 63(a), there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part, subject to the
exceptions provided in Part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating to
items not deductible).
62 Furthermore,

HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION
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Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co. 4 The Supreme

Court stated:
[Tihe priority-ordering directive of § 161 . . .requires that
the capitalization provision of § 263(a) take precedence, on the
facts here, over § 167(a). Section 161 provides that deductions
specified in Part VI of Subchapter B of the Income Tax Subtitle of the Code are "subject to the exceptions provided in Part
IX." Part VI includes § 167 and Part IX includes § 263.5
The Fourth Circuit, in turn, applied this language to Bodzin: "Part
VI includes § 162 and Part IX § 262. The priority ordering directive
of § 161 therefore requires, on the facts of this case, that . . .§ 262
take precedence over . . .§ 162(a)."16
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Idaho Power seems unwarranted.
Idaho Power concerned the interplay between the deductible depreciation allowed by § 167(a) and the § 263 requirement of capitalizing
expenditures incurred in the construction of capital assets." The
Supreme Court was more than cautious in limiting its interpretation
of § 161 to the precise facts of Idaho Power-depreciation deductions
and capitalization of expenditures. Thus, the Supreme Court found
that "[t]he clear import of § 161 is that. . . an expenditure incurred
in acquiring capital assets must be capitalized even when the expenditure otherwise might be deemed deductible under Part VI."'' Never" 418 U.S. 1 (1974).

Id. at 17.
509 F.2d at 681.
In Idaho Power, the respondent was a public utility that attempted to deduct,
under § 167(a), all the depreciation on its transportation 6quipment, which consisted
of cars, trucks, power-operated equipment, and trailers. In part, however, the equipment was used in the construction of capital facilities. The Supreme Court held that
the expenses related to the construction of capital assets must be capitalized, and thus
were not currently deductible as depreciation. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
11Id. at 17. This determination was buttressed by substantial legislative history.
The Court stated:
To the extent that reliance was placed on the congressional intent, in
the evolvement of the 1954 Code, to provide for "liberalization of
depreciation," H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1954),
that reliance is misplaced. The House Report also states that the
depreciation provisions would "give the economy added stimulus and

resilience without departing from realistic standards of depreciation
accounting." Id., at 24. 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p.
4049. To be sure, the 1954 Code provided for new and accelerated
methods for depreciation, resulting in greater depreciation deductions
currently available. These changes, however, relate primarily to computation of depreciation. Congress certainly did not intend that provi-
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theless, without any explanation for its action, the Fourth Circuit
applied the strictly-construed § 161 priority-ordering directive of
Idaho Power to a home office deduction case. This was clearly not the
intent of the Supreme Court; Idaho Power is barren of any language
that could be construed as permitting an application of the court's
interpretation beyond the depreciation/capitalization issue.
Even more important than the Fourth Circuit's failure to distinguish Idaho Power,6" however, is the court's failure to recognize that
§ 161 has been a part of the Code for as long as both §§ 162 and 262.
Hence, whatever priority-ordering directive has existed with respect
to the home office deduction must have been taken into account in
the line of cases culminating with Newi. Concomitantly with § 161,
Newi developed workable criteria for determining where the line
should be drawn between personal and business expenses. The
Fourth Circuit has in effect rejected those guidelines without furnishing adequate substitutes.
This is not to say that the Fourth Circuit has provided no substitutes at all. Coupling the priority-ordering directive of § 161 with the
court's implication that a home office deduction will be allowed only
when the taxpayer's regular office is either not available in evenings
and on weekends or is not suitable for the taxpayer's purposes, a fair
reading of Bodzin seems to be that the expense will always fall within
§ 262 unless an element of unavailability or unsuitability is present.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit has unduly restricted the deduction allowed
by § 162(a). Prior to Bodzin, unavailability and unsuitability provided examples of appropriate and helpful. They were sufficient, but
not required, to support a finding of "necessary." Thus several cases
allowed the home office deduction where the taxpayer's regular office
was both available and suitable." Now, however, these criteria will
sions for accelerated depreciation should be construed as enlarging the
class of depreciable assets to which § 167(a) has application or as
lessening the reach of § 263(a).
418 U.S. at 18-19.
11It is interesting that the Fourth Circuit attempted to distinguish Newi on the
basis that the Second Circuit had limited its holding to the facts there presented; yet,
at the same time, the Fourth Circuit has willing to ignore the fact that the Supreme
Court had restricted its § 161 construction to the precise facts of Idaho Power.
10In James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971), the Tax Court allowed
the deduction of home office expenses to a high school teacher who used a room in his
home to grade papers and prepare lessons. The Commissioner argued that the other
teachers at petitioner's school were able to perform their tasks during the free hour
allotted to them or during class time when students were working on assignments.
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have to be affirmatively shown, and in the Fourth Circuit, will be
used to determine whether the expense is a business one at all.7"
As a result of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bodzin, the inequality between non-employees and employees has resurfaced despite the
many recent home office cases which have shown a definite trend
toward allowing the deduction to an employee as readily as to a selfemployed individual. If the courts continue to assume that all nonemployee home office expenses are business ones,7 2 then the Fourth
Circuit's holding has relegated the employee's home office deduction
to the status, relative to the non-employee, of the pre-Newi line of
cases. In the Fourth Circuit, the employee will have to show that his
expense was a business one, whereas the non-employee will not have
to confront that issue.
Ironically, the effect of Bodzin may prove to be even more restrictive than the Commissioner himself intended. The Commissioner has
regularly taken the position that the home office must have been
required by the employer as a condition of employment in order for
the employee to take the deduction. 3 Since the Fourth Circuit has
Thus, the "office" provided was available and suitable for the petitioner's needs. The
Tax Court stated, however, that "we are not concerned with the manner in which
[petitioner's] colleagues accomplish their tasks. It may well be that the method of
presentation, the material to be corrected, and the sincere desire to teach a subject
well, distinguishes [petitioner] from his fellow teachers." Id. at 1078. It is, of course,
arguable that the "office" provided was unsuitable for the purposes of this particular
taxpayer. However, the fact that all the other teachers found the office suitable lends
support to the present analysis.
In Jay R. Gill, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 10 (1975), the taxpayer was the president
of a corporation that provided him with an office. Nevertheless, the petitioner maintained a home office in which he kept special equipment to read blueprints. The Tax
Court allowed the deduction of most of Gill's expenses in maintaining the office-inhome without any intimation that the corporate office was either unavailable or unsuitable. As the court stated:
In our opinion, the respondent misconceives the nature of the
"ordinary and necessary" standard contained in section 162. This
Court has held that "[tihe applicable test for judging the deductibility of home office expenses is whether .

.

. the maintenance of an

office in the home is appropriate and helpful under all the circumstances." [Citations omitted]. We believe that under all the circumstances petitioner has met this test, and consequently the expenses relating thereto are deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Id. at 16. Hence, the deduction was allowed without a showing of unavailability or
unsuitability.
7' See notes 55-60 and accompanying text supra.
72 See Notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
" Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 52, cited note 32 supra. This requirement has,
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arguably limited the deduction to those cases in which the regular
office is either unavailable or unsuitable, it is possible for a taxpayer
to meet the requirements of the Commissioner, but nevertheless be
denied the deduction by the Fourth Circuit. For example, if the Internal Revenue Service had required Bodzin to maintain a home office,
then the petitioner would have met the Commissioner's standards for
deductibility (assuming that the other requirements of Rev. Rul. No.
180 were met). Yet, it is plausible that the deduction would be disallowed since the regular office, according to the court of appeals, was
both available in the evenings and on weekends and suitable for the
purposes for which Bodzin was using his home office. Such a result
was obviously not contemplated by the Commissioner."
Another possible ramification of Bodzin is that the non-employee
will also have to show that his expenses are business ones. If the
courts now refuse to assume that a non-employee's home office expenses are business related, then the self-employed taxpayer may
have to prove the connection. Under the Fourth Circuit's restrictive
standards, the non-employee, like the employee, may be required to
show that his regular office is unavailable or unsuitable. Hence any
discrimination existing between the two classes of taxpayers will be
eliminated by bringing the non-employee down to the level of the
employee, but possibly with drastic effects. The self-employed individual will normally have access to his own regular office and that
office is certain to be suitable for the taxpayer's own purposes. Thus,
of course, been rejected many times by the courts. See notes 34-36 and accompanying
text supra.
" Nor is it contemplated in the legislation proposed by the House Ways and
Means Committee, the effect of which is to reinstate the "condition of employment"
test of Rev. Rul. No. 180. The proposed legislation states in pertinent part:
In general, a taxpayer will not be permitted to deduct any expenses
attributable to the use of his home for business purposes. The committee provided for three situations in which such expenses attributable
to the use of a portion of a taxpayer's residence for business use will
be permitted. A deduction will be permitted if a portion of the home
is used exclusively on a regular basis
(1) by a self-employed individual for the production, sale, and
service of goods or the rendition of services or as his principal executive office, or
(2) by an employee in connection with the performance of his
duties but only if it is required as a condition of his employment, or
(3) as rental property (but deductions will be limited to gross
income as under section 183).
Committee on Ways and Means, Release No. 5 (May 8, 1974). See also Rewrite Bulletin, 9 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX REP., 8270 (Jan. 22, 1975).

1975]

HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION

if the professional person were required to show unavailability or
unsuitability, he would virtually never be able to claim a home office
deduction.
While any statement as to the effects of Bodzin is conjecture, the
importance of the Fourth Circuit's holding cannot be overlooked. The
Commissioner has used § 262 to forge an inroad into the area of the
home office deduction. As appropriately stated by a commentator of
the Newi decision:
Although the Tax Court will no longer accept the "condition of employment" argument, the Service will undoubtedly
continue its attempt to control the office-at-home deduction.
This type of deduction clashes with the policy expressed in
Section 262, which denies deductions for personal, living and
family expenses. Taxpayers should expect the Service to explore new avenues of control.75
The Commissioner explored the avenue of § 262 with favorable results, for, in the Fourth Circuit at least, § 262 will apparently be used
as a means to deny home office deductions to employees. No longer
will the mere showing of "appropriate and helpful," as that phrase
was interpreted prior to the Fourth Circuit's holding, suffice to take
advantage of the deduction. The employee's regular office must at a
minimum be either unavailable or unsuitable to the carrying on of
his business, or his application for a business expense deduction for
his home office will fail.
STEPHEN DOUGLAS RosETHAL

75 Karachale, Deduction for Office-at-Home Expenses by Employees, 50 TAXEs
343, 345 (1972).

